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Abstract

Perkins, Brian Mitchell. MA. The University of Memphis. May/2013. Opposing
Interests: How Wikileaks Forces a Redrawing of the Battle Lines Between the First
Amendment and National Security. Major Professor: David Arant, PhD.
The mainstream press and the United States government have found harmony in
the still relatively undefined rules regarding the balance between national security and
free press. While the government tried a handful of individuals and groups under the
Espionage Act in the early 20th century, the press has avoided such trials. Even during the
Pentagon Papers case, the government only sought an injunction against publication,
which was ultimately not supported by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The 21st century presents a new set of challenges for this unwritten peace.
Wikileaks may be the proverbial guinea pig in determining how the balance between
national security and an informed public will be interpreted in the new, digital century.
This thesis explores what charges the organization could face, what an impact
such a precedent could have on the future of journalism, and how the American public
may be better served with a legislative, rather than judicial, solution.
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Introduction
Vice-President Joe Biden calls the leader of this organization “a high-tech

terrorist.”1 Bob Beckel, a deputy assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration,
called for his assassination: “[T]here’s only one way to do it: illegally shoot the son of a
bitch.”2 Representative Pete King (R-NY) called for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to
label the organization “a foreign terrorist organization.”3
These calls for retribution and assassination are not directed at al-Qaeda, Osama
bin Laden, or some other violent extremists. They are directed at an organization
responsible for the creation of a website dedicated to providing “an innovative, secure
and anonymous way for sources to leak information to our journalists.”4
Wikileaks and its founder Julian Assange have been under fire from many in the
United States and other governments around the world following the release of thousands
of secretive documents, including portions of a cache of over 250,000 diplomatic cables
dating back to the 1960s.5 The organization became a well-known entity in the United
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MacAskill, Ewen, “Julian Assange Like a High-Tech Terrorist, says Joe Biden,” The
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“Illegally Killing Assange: ‘A Dead Man Can’t Leak Stuff’,” Huffington Post,
December 7, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/07/fox-news-bob-beckelcalls_n_793467.html.
3
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November 29, 2010, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/130863-top%20republican-designate-wikileaks-as-a-terrorist-org.
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The New York Times, November 28, 2010,
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States in 2010 when it released a leaked video, “Collateral Murder,” that shows an
American military helicopter “open[ing] fire on people on a street in Baghdad.”6
Later that year, Wikileaks collaborated with established newspapers around the
world, including The New York Times and The Guradian, to begin releasing portions of
the cache of diplomatic cables.7 The White House called the release “reckless and
dangerous,”8 while Assange calls the actions of his organization “free press [activism]”
and “a new way of doing journalism.”9 In light of Assange’s aim for the organization,
Beckel’s comment becomes even more radical; a former deputy assistant Secretary of
State, on national television, called for the assassination of a man that claims to be
running a journalism organization, which is not exactly what one thinks of when he hears
the word “terrorist.”
The fact of the matter is that the rest of the world is not quite sure what to make of
Wikileaks. Critics consider the organization a rogue outlet seeking to bring a dose of
anarchy to the so-called established powers.10 Supporters may argue the organization is a
new form of citizen journalism that tries to connect sources and whistleblowers with
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those ready to publish instantly on the Internet.11 In light of the vitriol that is being
directed at this organization, it is important to understand where Wikileaks and other nontraditional journalists and news organizations fit within the commonly understood
frameworks of news organizations, free press, social responsibility, and even the legal
system.
Further, if Wikileaks represents the vanguard of an emerging amateurized press,
will courts be sought more frequently to address tension between national security and
the First Amendment? How can our political and legal systems establish norms or
regulations that prevent the dissemination of information that will present a “clear and
present danger” without having a chilling effect on all of the press in reporting
information that is needed for an informed public? Should such norms be established?
This thesis examines the U.S. government’s ability to successfully prosecute
Julian Assange, or other members of Wikileaks, for publication of national security
documents. First, this document will explore federal statutes, such as the Espionage Act
of 1917, and the literature related to publication of classified government documents.
Then, it will examine legal precedents set by landmark court cases such as Near v.
Minnesota, Schenck v. United States, and New York Times v. United States to understand
how the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled in the past and just how much
ambiguity remains in the tension between free press and national security. Finally, these
legal concepts will be used to analyze the current Wikileaks controversy.
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Literature Review
Government leaks are nothing new to the United States or other countries around

the world, for that matter. In fact, government officials have been suspected of using
leaks for strategic and political purposes for years.1 Steven Aftergood, director of the
Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists, told NPR,
"Classified information [may be] disclosed not only to undermine or challenge policy, but
to explain it, to defend it and to interpret it for the public.”2
Despite describing itself as a group of journalists, Wikileaks confesses an activist
role in seeking “transparency in government activities […] to reduced corruption, better
government and stronger democracies.”3 This inherent activism, along with its existence
as an Internet-based organization with the sole purpose of publishing government secrets,
does distinguish Wikileaks from traditional American news sources such as The New York
Times or Washington Post. Additionally, Wikileaks serves as both a symbolic and very
real expression of the expanded ability for data and information to be spread across the
globe on the Internet. That expanded ability is made possible by the constantly evolving
technology and the newly developed tools for socialization on the web.4 For government
agencies, this expansion makes the task of keeping secrets much more difficult. These
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!Gjelten, Tom, “Does Leaking Secret Documents Damage National Security?” National
Public Radio, June 12, 2012, http://www.npr.org/2012/06/12/154802210/does-leaking-secretsdamage-national-security.
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tools have reduced the cost of publication and, therefore, have increased the numbers of
publishers.5 Further, the Internet has made it difficult for the government to control, or
even influence, the way that leaked documents are published.
The dramatic improvement in our social tools, by contrast, makes our control over
those tools much more like steering a kayak. We are being pushed rapidly down a
route largely determined by the technological environment. We have a small
degree of control over the spread of these tools, but that control does not extend to
our being able to reverse, stop, or even radically alter the direction we’re moving
in. Our principal challenge is not to decide where we want to go but rather to stay
upright as we go.6
Inspecting the reaction of government officials to Wikileaks, the vitriol and anger may be
a reflection of fear and a sense of lost control in this new digital era.
More important than understanding why the organization is perceived as a threat
and as an enemy of state, rather than as a news organization, is the concern that the
perception of Wikileaks as a criminal organization makes a potential prosecution more
likely in the future—a case that could set a precedent for journalists across the country. A
quick glance at federal statutes and case history reveals a great deal of ambiguity in
regards to publication of classified documents—an ambiguity that may be fitting
considering the delicate balance of conflicting interests in free press and national
security.
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Alexander Bickel, a Yale law professor who argued the case for The New York

Times in the Pentagon Papers case, suggested that the seeming victory in that case may in
fact have come at a cost.7 “Those freedoms that are neither challenged nor defined are the
most secure […] [conflict and contention] endanger an assumed freedom, which appeared
limitless because its limits were untried. We extend the legal reality of freedom at some
cost in its limitless appearance.”8
Any attempt to prosecute Wikileaks may implicate other media organizations and
force an establishment of definitive rulings on publication of national secrets that some
members of the judiciary have seemingly been hoping to avoid. In United States v.
Progressive, Inc.,9 District Judge Warren, faced with ruling on whether or not to allow
publication of an article that explains how a hydrogen bomb is built, wrestled with the
responsibility of protecting the rights of the press, while also potentially saving lives.
The Court is faced with the difficult task of weighing and resolving these
divergent views. A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously
infringe cherished First Amendment rights. If a preliminary injunction is issued, it
will constitute the first instance of prior restraint against a publication in this
fashion in the history of this country, to this Court's knowledge. Such notoriety is
not to be sought. It will curtail defendants' First Amendment rights in a drastic
and substantial fashion. It will infringe upon our right to know and to be informed
as well. A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished
and the right to publish becomes moot.10
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Judge Warren went so far as to extend the time for a compromise to be reached

between The Progressive and the government, that at the end of his ruling he allowed for
the two parties to attempt to resolve the dispute with a panel of five mediators, “so as to
simultaneously moot the case and set a desirable precedent for the future.”11
Today, members of the United States Congress do not necessarily share Judge
Warren’s restraint and concern about setting dangerous precedents. In July 2012, The
Sydney Morning Herald reported that the United States Justice Department is continuing
its criminal investigation into Julian Assange.12 Senator Dianne Feinstein, a member of
the Senate Intelligence Oversight Committee, continued calls for Assange to be
prosecuted for espionage, saying, “He has caused serious harm to US national security,
and he should be punished accordingly.”13 Attempts to bring about a resolution through
legislation or the judicial system in the current political climate may jeopardize the rights
of not only non-traditional outlets like Wikileaks, but also members of the traditional
press.
Complicating matters further is the blurring of the line between professionals and
amateurs in the journalism field. The Internet and the many social tools that have
developed within it have changed the way that people communicate and interact. Clay
Shirky wrote that “most of the barriers to group action have collapsed, and without those
barriers, we are free to explore new ways of gathering together and getting things
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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done.”14 Shirky goes on to describe one of those barriers as the transaction costs of
publishing and public expression, saying that the “result is the mass amateurization of
efforts previously reserved for media professionals.”15
The Internet has created a virtual world where anyone can publish—seemingly
cost free. Whether one uses tools like Facebook or Twitter, or creates a website using
Webs.com, one can transmit messages, pictures, and documents around the world
relatively easily. This has created a network of amateur journalists, not necessarily
affiliated with a news organization, changing the fundamental question about publishing,
as Shirky puts it, “from ‘Why publish this?’ to ‘Why not?’”16 Yochai Benkler refers to
this wave of new actors as the creation of a “networked fourth estate.”17 This network of
decentralized production led Benkler to draw an analogy to the entrance of cable news
networks. “If the first Gulf War was the moment of the twenty-four-hour news channel
and CNN, then the Iranian Reform movement of 2009 was the moment of amateur video
reportage, as videos taken by amateurs were uploaded to YouTube, and from there
became the only significant source of video footage of the demonstrations available to the
major international news outlets.”18 In that sense, this decentralized method of production
is supporting, and at times competing with, the traditional, professional members of the
press. Wikileaks, in creating a digital network to collect and disseminate secret
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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government documents, is a preeminent example of the power of these decentralized
networks and how they work outside of the typical institutionalized framework.
Digital organizations such as Wikileaks, which lack many of the traditional
internal and external safeguards that so-called “professional” members of the press
embody, may be more difficult to predict and difficult to control. In addition, the very
nature of the Internet, in which information can very rarely be “unpublished,” increases
the danger of uninhibited distribution of national secrets.19 In fact, David Corneil argues
that the so-called Streisand effect, in which attempts to censor information on the Internet
actually attract more attention to a document than would otherwise be the case, makes
attempts to censor and prosecute even more dangerous than the initial leak.20 Indeed
Wikileaks presents a 21st century problem, and our laws seem to be based on 20th century
technology.
Another challenge of this decentralization is the lack of understanding and
acceptance by members of the traditional institutions. Susan Milligan, a political writer,
wrote in an opinion piece for US News and World Report that while “on its face,
technology can be hugely democratizing[…] too many people have lost the ability to
distinguish between speaking the truth to power and just being an irresponsible jerk. This
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Childs, William G., “When the Bell Can’t be Unrung: Document Leaks and Protective
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is how we’ve come to endure Wikileaks…”21 Senator Dianne Feinstein echoed those
statements in the Wall Street Journal saying, “But [Asssange] is no journalist. He is an
agitator intent on damaging our government, whose policies he happens to disagree with,
regardless of who gets hurt.”22
Assange and the entire Wikileaks operation have been the target of these kinds of
accusations, despite the fact that even the Pentagon has announced that the repercussions
of the leaked documents have hardly been damaging to US interests.23 Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates said in 2010, “Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes.
Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.”24 Indeed, much of the
rhetoric surrounding the leaks seems to have more to do with the organization that
released the documents, rather than the content. Salon’s Glenn Greenwald noted this
point when he replaced each appearance of the word “Assange” with “New York Times”
in a statement issued by Dianne Feinstein.25 The edited statement read as follows, “’I
believe [The New York Times] has knowingly obtained and disseminated classified

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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information which could cause injury to the United States,’ […] ‘[It] has caused serious
harm to US national security, and [] should be prosecuted accordingly.’”26
Greenwald’s point is that considering The New York Times, among other news
organizations, collaborated with and published the same documents that Wikileaks
released, those organizations have committed the same offenses.
Clearly there is a great deal of tension in the conflicting interests of an informed
public and national security. These tensions only grow stronger in times of national
emergency. Turning to the legislature to address this tension would allow for a national
debate on what the role of the press should be in terms of publishing national defense
information. While court cases often arise from the urgency of national crises, when fear
and other emotional responses can cloud one’s view of the larger issues at play, a debate
in Congress would allow for a comprehensive exploration of the tension. Further, it
would provide clarity for journalists, both professional and non-professional, so that one
can freely publish without threat of restraint or retribution. The chilling effect of the
ambiguity that surrounds the tension between press and national security, alongside the
very public calls for retribution against the press, may become the de facto law of the
land and discourage members of the press from pursuing stories that involve foreign
policy and activities during wartime.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Research Questions

RQ 1
Given what is known about the circumstances of the Wikileaks case, would the
courts find Julian Assange and Wikileaks to be a news publisher like the New York
Times?
RQ 2
If Wikileaks and Julian Assange were judged to be a news publisher like the New
York Times, are Wikileaks and other news publishers subject to prosecution for publishing
leaked state secrets under the Sedition Act or other federal law?

RQ 3
Given what is known about the circumstances of the Wikileaks case, could the
government successfully prosecute Julian Assange and Wikileaks for possession and theft
of state secrets rather than as a publisher, much like it did with Daniel Ellsberg?

12
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Method
To answer these questions, this thesis examines the reported actions that led to

Wikileaks’ disclosure of United States government documents. Wikileaks’ actions will be
compared to what traditional members of the press, such as the New York Times, did in
receiving and publishing the leaked government documents. Next, this thesis explores the
legal precedents and federal statutes that pertain to publication. Then, legal precedents
pertinent to Wikileaks’ situation will be examined and applied to the Wikileaks facts.
This document will conclude with an evaluation of what legal avenues the
government may have in prosecuting Wikileaks for publishing, as well as the legal
protections afforded to the organization under the First Amendment. Finally,
consideration will be given to the ramifications for traditional and non-traditional
members of the press that a Wikileaks prosecution may pose.

13
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Analysis

Would the Court find Wikileaks to be a news publisher like the New York Times?
In short, Supreme Court precedent suggests that the law does not distinguish
between various publishers. The legal protections under the First Amendment will extend
to The New York Times, as well as an individual’s personal blog. The same can be said
for the legal ramifications of a publisher’s activities. This means that any ruling against
Assange, or his network, will likely have far reaching implications for publishes large
and small.
The question of whether or not Wikileaks should be considered a bona fide news
operation is arguably one of the most significant questions in terms of whether or not the
government will attempt to pursue a criminal prosecution of members of the
organization. At the same time, it may have the least impact on the court case itself.
Criminal prosecution is only being discussed because Wikileaks is perceived to be
somehow different that the traditional press, like the New York Times. Yet, at the same
time, this perceived difference in status will likely not have a significant bearing on the
outcome of a prosecution.
It should not go unnoticed that public officials are calling for prosecution of
Julian Assange and his organization, but not for punishing the Times.1 In fact, the US
Government response has taken a toll on Wikileaks’ bank accounts. Several American
companies, including PayPal and MasterCard, have stopped allowing donations to be
made to the organization. A vice president with PayPal, Osama Bedier, acknowledged
that his company stopped allowing transactions to Wikileaks following a State
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Department letter that classified the organization’s activities as illegal.2 To date, Julian
Assange says actions by companies like MasterCard have cost his organization over $50
million.3 The State Department has not written such letters to the Times, and PayPal
continues to do business with The Grey Lady. In that sense, the perceived difference
between the two organizations is having a very significant impact on Wikileaks.
While many public officials are attempting to distinguish between Wikileaks and
real journalists, the Supreme Court has already ruled that the freedom of the press does
not simply apply to institutions. In Lovell v. City of Griffin, Chief Justice Hughes wrote
the opinion for the court, making it clear that newspapers are not the only entity protected
by the First Amendment.4 “The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and
periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been
historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others
in our own history abundantly attest. The press in its connotation comprehends every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”5 Lovell suggests that
Wikileaks should be afforded the same protections and liabilities as The New York Times.
If that is the case, the courts cannot seek to punish Wikileaks for its publications
on the basis that it does not meet some standard to be considered for First Amendment
protections. In that sense, it would likely not do the prosecution any good to attempt to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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define Wikileaks as a non-member of the press. While the distinction may serve the
government’s interest in the court of public opinion, it is a battle that it likely would not
win in the court of law.
Are publishers subject to prosecution for publishing leaked state secrets?
The courts may have no need to distinguish between traditional members of the
press and new actors like Wikileaks. The Supreme Court has consistently denied the
existence of an absolute right to First Amendment protections. In a general sense, the
court has been clear that the First Amendment is to prevent prior restraint, but is not
necessarily intended to grant immunity to publishers after publication. Further, federal
courts have resisted the view that the press has special rights that are not afforded to
ordinary citizens. In that case, publishers are just as liable for violating federal law, such
as the Espionage Act, as an individual citizen.
In 1907, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared in Patterson v. Colorado that
“the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is ‘to prevent all previous restraints
upon publications’ […] not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare.”6 Holmes continued to draw a distinction between
prior restraint and punishment after publication by saying, “the preliminary freedom
extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well
to the true as to the false.”7
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In Schenck v. United States (1919), Holmes went further to set a standard for

prosecution for publication.8 The Schenck case was one of the first to address First
Amendment issues with the Espionage Act of 1917, with Justice Holmes famously
establishing the “clear and present danger” test.9
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.10
Interestingly, this case represents strengthening of First Amendment protections
relative to the Patterson ruling. While Holmes, writing for a unanimous court, upheld the
Schenck conviction for encouraging opposition to the draft, he established that times of
war bring about greater restrictions on free speech.11 This “clear and present danger”
clause, while relatively vague, at least forces the court to weigh the competing interests of
free speech and national government interest.
The question that arises for Wikileaks is whether or not the United States is in a
time of war. The United States has forces in active fighting zones and has been fighting
the so-called “War on Terror,” but Congress has yet to make an official declaration. The
quote above from Holmes says that speech can be limited “so long as men fight,” but one
has to presume that he never imagined an indefinite, undeclared conflict like the one the
United States finds itself in today.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Further, Holmes wrote this famous decision, but seemed to split from the Court in

subsequent rulings.12 The first dissent was written later in 1919, a mere months after the
Schenck ruling, in Abrams v United States.13 In this case, the court found that “the plain
purpose of their propaganda was to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection,
sedition, riots…” and upheld the conviction.14 Holmes disagreed with the finding,
writing, “It is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that
warrants Congress in setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are
not concerned. Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to change the mind of the
country.”15 Holmes is searching for a much more stringent evaluation of clear and present
danger, arguing that there can be meaningful debate about the execution of war without
the speech meeting the standard of criminal.
In Schaefer v. United States, Holmes joined Brandeis in concurring with the
convictions that were reversed, but dissented in arguing that the other three judgments
should also be reversed.16 The court found that three of the defendants were indeed
responsible for publishing false information, but Brandeis and Holmes argued that
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“to prosecute men for such publications reminds me of the days when men were hanged
for constructive treason.”17 Brandeis, with Holmes, begins to push back on the portion of
clear and present danger that argues for restricting speech in time of war.
Nor will this grave danger end with the passing of the war. The constitutional
right of free speech has been declared to be the same in peace and in war. In
peace, too, men may differ widely as to what loyalty to our country demands; and
an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future,
as it has often been in the past, to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it
disagrees. Convictions such as these, besides abridging freedom of speech,
threaten freedom of thought and of belief.18
In just two years, a pair of cases had already begun to test the limits of the “clear
and present danger” test. Holmes, the architect of the test, had dissented from the court
opinion and joined Justice Brandeis in a qualified concurring opinion. It was clear that
Holmes had a different vision in mind of what constituted “clear and present danger” and
when that could be used as justification for punishment for publication.
In 1925, the Court upheld a New York state statute that penalized “advocating,
advising, or teaching the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means” in
Gitlow v. The People of New York.19 The court also broke new ground in upholding the
statute because it was an exercise of the state’s right to ensure self-preservation.20 “When
the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its
discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that
they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the
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prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open
to consideration. It is sufficient that the statute itself be constitutional and that the use of
the language comes within its prohibition.”21
In other words, the Court argued that when a legislative body has crafted a law
that ensures the continuity and security of the legitimate government, as an exercise of
the police authority of the state, the Court need not question whether or not the speech
will actually bring about the evils that the statute hopes to prevent, as long as the speech
falls within the confines of the statute. The Court is showing great deference to the
legislature, determining that “the legislative body itself has previously determined the
danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified character.”22
Once again, Holmes and Justice Brandeis pen a dissenting opinion. Holmes writes
that he believed the decision in Abrams departed from his clear and present danger
doctrine.23 Holmes continued to write in opposition of how his doctrine was being
applied, in this case arguing that the text in question presented no “present danger of an
attempt to overthrow the government by force…”24 Holmes desired a more conservative
interpretation of danger.
It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement.
Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression of an opinion
and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result.
Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the redundant
discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagration.
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If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to
be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.25

While Holmes may have intended for the clear and present danger test to set a high
threshold for restricting speech, the majority of the court continued to uphold many of the
rulings involving the Espionage Act and other statutes restricting speech—even years
after World War I had ended.
In Near v. Minnesota, the Court reaffirmed the right to freedom from prior
restraint, while also making it clear that the amendment is not intended to prevent
prosecution after publication.26 In writing the court opinion, Chief Justice Hughes stated,
“Punishment for the abuse of the liberty accorded to the press is essential for the
protection of the public, and the common-law rules that subject a libeler to responsibility
for the public offense, as well as for the private injury, are not abolished by the
constitutional protection of such liberty.”27
The Near case dealt with a Minnesota statute that publishers may be enjoined
from publication if it frequently publishes scandalous material and is found “guilty of a
nuisance.”28 The statute did allow for publishers to continue printing if it could prove to
the court that future publications were “true and published ‘with good motives and for
justifiable ends.’”29

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25

Ibid., 673.

26

Near v Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

27

Ibid., 715.

28

Ibid., 702.

29

Ibid., 710.

21

!

!
Hughes addressed this by writing, “If this can be done, the legislature may

provide machinery for determining in the complete exercise of its discretion what are
justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly. And it would be but a step to a
complete system of censorship.”30
Still, the Near decision is not a clear victory for freedom from publication
punishment. Chief Justice Hughes made it clear that the First Amendment is meant only
to prevent prior restraint. He addressed mostly libelous publications when he wrote,
“The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent
punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false. This was the law of criminal
libel apart from statute in most cases, if not in all.”31 Still, he extended this a bit further
by writing, “Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes
what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences for his own
temerity.”32 This seemingly leaves an opening for a much broader interpretation.
In 1951, the Supreme Court would once again visit the debate between a state
legislature’s right to pronounce some types of speech as unwelcome and a broad
protection granted by the First Amendment. In Dennis v. United States, Chief Justice
Vinson argued that even Holmes and Brandeis did not intend for “clear and present
danger” to become “crystallized into a rigid rule to be applied inflexibly without regard to
the circumstances of each case. Speech is not an absolute, above and beyond control by
the legislature when its judgment, subjected to review here, is that certain kinds of speech
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are so undesirable as to warrant criminal sanction.”33 Again, Vinson is giving the
legislative bodies authority to determine what types of speech may and may not be
permissible—a fairly broad power in regards to free speech.
The Dennis case applied the “clear and present danger” rule and found that
overthrow of the government was in fact a substantial government interest worth
infringement of speech.34 However, the justices noted that while that evil was not
necessarily imminent, the government had a right to act preemptively. “If Government is
aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and
to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the
circumstances permit, action by the Government is required.”35
This indicates that a legislature may determine that certain publications pose such
a threat to the stability of the government, that such publication may not enjoy First
Amendment protections. This is the justification used for the creation of the Atomic
Energy Act36 and the very specific limits that have been made on the ability to publish
information pertaining to the government’s nuclear activities.
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Through the two rulings in Dennis and Abrams, it seems that the court has limited

its own role in applying a broad interpretation of the First Amendment in the case where
a legislative body has acted. A court could very well rule that the Espionage Act is
similar in nature, and therefore publication of information related to defense activities is
afforded no such protection due to the decision by Congress to pass the act.
To this point, the Court had not yet directly addressed the rights of news
publishers when distributing information related to national security. In Schenck, the
court established that in times of war there are certain limits to First Amendment
protections. The “clear and present” danger test was intended to help establish those rare
cases in which the First Amendment did not protect speech. Still, Schenck, Abrams, and
Schaefer mostly dealt with opinion speech, rather than what we would consider today to
be news coverage. Schaefer comes the closest to dealing with news content, but certainly
does not include the publication of national security information. Near makes it clear that
the First Amendment is meant as a protection against prior restraint; it is not clear if that
means there is little or no protection from punishment after publication.
Interestingly, just a few years after Near, the Court would hand down a decision
striking down a special publishing tax in the State of Louisiana.37 In Grosjean v.
American Press Co., the court justified striking down the tax by arguing that using means
other than prior restraint may in fact be infringing upon First Amendment rights. “It is
impossible to concede that by the words 'freedom of the press' the framers of the
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amendment intended to adopt merely the narrow view then reflected by the law of
England that such freedom consisted only in immunity from previous censorship; for this
abuse had then permanently disappeared from English practice.”38
The court found that the tax was a “deliberate and calculated device” to limit the
circulation of information.39 Citing Judge Cooley, the court went on to write, “‘The evils
to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the
government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of
public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent
exercise of their rights as citizens.’”40 This calls for a much more absolute reading of the
First Amendment, specifically in regards to public information. Simultaneously, it
provides priority status for the protection of press rights in regards to information vital to
an informed public. Those protections can often come in conflict with national security in
times of war.
Additionally, could the same ruling be said of the Espionage Act? Without an
exemption for the publication of information that is of public interest, the act seems to
broadly inhibit the press’ ability to report on the conduct of the military during a time of
war. The Espionage Act, at least as it has been interpreted in previous cases, may in fact
prevent free and general discussion of military conduct during war. For, what is of more
concern to the public than the execution and government activities during the war?
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Moreover, in Yates v. United States, the court argued that it has long recognized a

difference between “advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promoting
unlawful action.”41 While the court was addressing the application of The Smith Act, it
would be reasonable for the court to make a similar distinction when dealing with the
Espionage Act. In the Yates ruling, the court is clearly attempting to prevent an overly
broad interpretation of advocating. The Espionage Act contains a similarly vague
wording in addressing “information that the possessor has reason to believe could be used
to the injury of the United States.”42 The court could find that there is a distinction
between information that is of value to the public debate versus information that is solely
used to directly attack the country. Such an interpretation would significantly narrow the
meaning of injury of the United States and prevent a number of potential conflicts
between the press and national security. In the case of Wikileaks, it may make it
significantly more difficult to argue that releasing cables from past communications or
video of past military activities poses a significant threat of injury to the country in the
present or future.
The Supreme Court finally directly addressed the competing interests of free
speech and national security concerns in New York Times v. United States. New York
Times addressed questions about prior restraint of the press from publishing leaked
documents related to the Vietnam War—the so-called Pentagon Papers.43 In this case, the
United States government sought an injunction against The New York Times and
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Washington Post to prevent the papers from publishing classified documents.44 In
evaluating the Pentagon Papers’ release solely in the prism of prior restraint, the court
found in favor of The New York Times 6-3, but was only able to agree on a brief per
curiam opinion.45 The concurring and dissenting opinions are as plentiful as they are
varying and leave plenty of doubt as to what the precedent should be from this case.
Justice White, echoing the sentiments of Justice Hughes in Near, concurred with
the Court decision. However, he cautioned that the Court ruling did not mean that the
press had free rein in publishing government secrets. He went so far as to say the
government made the mistake of seeking an injunction rather than a criminal prosecution.
What is more, terminating the ban on publication of the relatively few sensitive
documents the Government now seeks to suppress does not mean that the law
either requires or invites newspapers or others to publish them or that they will be
immune from criminal action if they do. Prior restraints require an unusually
heavy justification under the First Amendment; but failure by the Government to
justify prior restraints does not measure its constitutional entitlement to a
conviction for criminal publication. That the government mistakenly chose to
proceed by injunction does not mean that it could not successfully proceed in
another way.46
White also pointed out several cases that applied to the Pentagon Papers case and that
might also apply to a potential Wikileaks prosecution. He added, “section 798 also in
precise language, proscribes knowing and willful publication of any classified
information concerning the cryptographic systems or communication intelligence
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activities of the United States[.]”47 He added, “I would have no difficulty in sustaining
convictions under these sections on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity
and the imposition of a prior restraint.”48
Justice Black’s opinion is perhaps the closest to First Amendment absolutism.
“Paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of
the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of
foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell[...]The press was protected so that it could bare
the secrets of government and inform the people.”49 Further, Black took aim at his
colleagues, finding it “unfortunate that my Brethren are apparently willing to hold that
the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding would make a
shambles of the First Amendment.”50
Justice Douglas, who also wrote his own opinion, joins Black in viewing the First
Amendment in its most absolute terms. Douglas, in a concurring opinion, argued that the
Internal Security Act of 1950, which amended this chapter, makes it clear that § 793 does
not apply to the press.
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish military
or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon freedom of the press
or of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and no
regulation shall be promulgated hereunder having that effect.”51
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Justice Blackmun, in dissent, criticized the frantic pace forced upon the case,

before claiming that what was needed was a standard for balancing free press and
national security.
“What is needed here is a weighing, upon properly developed standards, of the
broad right of the press to print and of the very narrow right of the Government to
prevent. Such standards are not yet developed. The parties here are in
disagreement as to what those standards should be. But even the newspapers
concede that there are situations where restraint is in order and is
constitutional.”52
Overall, it is clear that the majority stood opposed to prior restraint. Still, three
dissenting justices (Harlan, Burger, and Blackmun) were willing to completely suppress
the document, while two of the concurring justices (White and Stewart) were open to
criminal prosecution for the publication of the documents. The justices seemed open to
criminal cases against The New York Times and The Washington Post.
If the First Amendment is indeed interpreted as only a prohibition on prior
restraint, and not a guaranteed immunity for reporters covering stories of public interest,
the ability of reporters to uncover secretive government activities is in jeopardy.
Members of the media, as well as Wikileaks, may not be able to seek First Amendment
protections from federal statutes such as the Espionage Act.
More recently, however, some court rulings have been willing to exempt
members of the press from prosecution when the reporter’s actions are related to
newsgathering and are, in and of themselves, legal. Herein lies another murky area of the
law. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, it was found that the First Amendment still protected
publication of information of public importance that was lawfully discovered, even if the
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information was stolen by a third-party, so long as the reporter did not participate in the
crime.53 “We think it clear that […] a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”54
However, some courts have debated on what is and is not “participation” on the
part of the reporter. In Boehner v. McDermott, the appellate court initially found that if
the recipient met with the party who stole the material, unlike the anonymous drop-off in
Bartnicki, then the recipient of the information knowingly accepted a document that was
stolen.55
“It is the difference between someone who discovers a bag containing a diamond
ring on the sidewalk and someone who accepts the same bag from a thief,
knowing the ring inside to have been stolen. The former has committed no
offense; the latter is guilty of receiving stolen property, even if the ring was
intended only as a gift.”56
When the court heard the case once again en banc, the court found that there was
no fundamental difference from Bartnicki.57 In other words, knowing the person that
committed the illegal act does not itself make the reporter’s acceptance of the material
illegal and, therefore, without First Amendment protections. However, what if the
reporter offers anonymity—or as Wikileaks does—a means of secretly turning over
classified documents?
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In the Wikileaks case, federal prosecutors have obtained logs of online instant

message conversations in which Bradley Manning, the former military official accused of
leaking documents to Wikileaks, allegedly admits to communicating with Julian
Assange.58 In those logs, Manning seemingly acknowledges communicating with
Assange and that Assange gave him access to a special server for uploading the files.59 In
the first Barnicki ruling, the alleged communication with Manning may have been
enough to conclude that Assange conspired to steal the documents and therefore had no
legal right to publish. A more narrow ruling could perhaps argue that providing a server
is assisting with the theft of the documents. Even that kind of ruling would have major
impacts on even traditional reporters, as offering an email address may be considered
aiding in the theft of a document.
A recent district court judge seems to go a step further in striking down the idea
that examining documents is even a necessity of an informed press and public. In fact, he
went so far as to say mere possession by a reporter may in and of itself be a violation of
the Espionage Act, regardless of how it was obtained. In United States v. Rosen, a federal
judge in Virginia ruled that the federal government could prosecute non-employees for
possession of national defense documents.60 In rejecting a motion to dismiss the case,
Judge Ellis wrote that “their position is that once a government secret has been leaked to
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the general public and the first line of defense thereby breached, the government has no
recourse but to sit back and watch as the threat to the national security caused by the first
disclosure multiplies with every subsequent disclosure. This position cannot be
sustained.”61 This ruling indicates that even though Manning may be charged with the
initial leaking of the government documents related to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, that does not prevent the government from pursuing prosecutions of the
media members that then possessed the information. Judge Ellis continued, “[B]oth
common sense and the relevant precedent point persuasively to the conclusion that the
government can punish those outside of the government for the unauthorized receipt and
deliberate retransmission of information relating to the national defense.”62
Ellis attempts to provide some limitations to this ruling by arguing that “this
conclusion rests on the limitation of §793 to situations in which national security is
genuinely at risk.”63 In citing the ruling in Morison,64 Ellis added, “[T]o take a
hypothetical example, without this limitation the statute could be used to punish a
newspaper for publishing a classified document that simply recounts official misconduct
in awarding defense contracts. As demonstrated by the concurrences in Morison, such a
prosecution would clearly violate the First Amendment.”65 Ellis argued that the
government must prove that the information relates to national defense, that the
government classified the information, and that the person violating the provision knew
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the information may harm the national security.66 Ellis argued that the government should
have to prove that the information could do harm to national security; however, Gorin
ruled just the opposite, saying that proof of harm is not required. In either case, the
reporter or publisher with possession of these documents may be left to guess whether or
not a judge will find that the documents are a danger to the national security and not a
case of embarrassment. In a potential sign that the limiting factor could prove
reasonable, the prosecution ended up dropping the charges in Rosen, potentially finding
the limiting factor laid out by Ellis as too difficult to overcome.67
Judge Ellis makes several references to the limitations set forth by Judge
Wilkinson’s concurring opinion in United States v. Morison.68 Judge Wilkinson argued
that “the First Amendment interest in informed popular debate does not simply vanish at
the invocation of the words ‘national security’ […] elections turn on the conduct of
foreign affairs and strategies of national defense […]”69 Wilkinson goes on to describe
the inherent tension between an informed public and the ability to maintain security
operations. While agreeing with the Court’s opinion to uphold the conviction of a former
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intelligence officer who gave photographs of Soviet naval stations to the press, Wilkinson
also made it clear, “This prosecution was not an attempt to apply the espionage statute to
the press for either the receipt or publication of classified materials.”70
Note that Wilkinson explicitly confirms that this opinion was not an attempt to
apply the Espionage Act to the reporting activities of the press. Yet in the Rosen
proceedings, government attorneys do not eliminate the possibility of such a criminal
prosecution. The government lawyers added, “There plainly is no exemption in the
statutes for the press […].”71 They acknowledge, “Stating this, we recognize that a
prosecution under the espionage laws of an actual member of the press for publishing
classified information leaked to it by a government source, would raise legitimate and
serious issues and would not be undertaken lightly, indeed, the fact that there has never
been such a prosecution speaks for itself.”72
It seems that there is an implication in this statement that though no federal statute
exists to provide protection for reporting activities, there are special considerations for
the press. However, what if public officials choose to discriminate between press and
non-press? Could there be a distinction made between Wikileaks and The New York
Times?
Times editor Bill Keller is concerned about that very item. In an email to
GigaOM, an online media and technology blog, Keller wrote, “I would regard an attempt
to criminalize WikiLeaks’ publication of these documents as an attack on all of us, and I
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70

Ibid., 1085.

71

Pincus, Walter, “Press Can Be Prosecuted For Having Secret Files, U.S. Says,” The
Washington Post, February 22, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/21/AR2006022101947.html.
72

Ibid.

34

!

!

believe the mainstream media should come to his defense.”73 Don’t forget that in Lovell,
the Court ruled that the First Amendment applies to pamphlets as well as newspapers, so
if the First Amendment is being used as a means to protect news institutions, it must be
applied equally to non-professional publishers.74
In Dennis v United States, Justice Frankfurter argued in a concurring opinion that
there needs to be more clarity in how we determine what is fit for publication and what is
not.75 One of Justice Frankfurter’s key points is that the terminology in the clear and
present danger is oversimplified.76 “It were far better that the phrase be abandoned than
that it be sounded once more to hide from the believers in an absolute right of free speech
the plain fact that the interest in speech, profoundly important as it is, is no more
conclusive in judicial review than other attributes of democracy or than a determination
of the people's representatives that a measure is necessary to assure the safety of
government itself.”77 Frankfurter went on to call for Congress to balance the tension
between the competing interests of national security and free speech.
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“Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the situation before
us of necessity belongs to the Congress. The nature of the power to be exercised by this
Court has been delineated in decisions not charged with the emotional appeal of
situations such as that now before us.”78
Clearly these recent rulings raise the prospect that the court could try to determine
that Wikileaks is a different type of actor than the New York Times. A less slippery slope
would seem to involve a ruling based upon the content, rather than the publisher. The
courts may be better served ruling that those documents were not appropriate for
publication, by any entity, rather than attempting to draw different precedents for the
professional and amateur press. In the strictest sense, as there is no federal exemption
from prosecution for any member of the press, it is very possible for Wikileaks, and other
publishers, to be prosecuted for publication of national secrets.
Could the government successfully prosecute Wikileaks for possession and theft of
state secrets rather than as a publisher?
A more direct and perhaps less legally complex prosecution may involve treating
Assange and his colleagues as leakers, rather than publishers. The government would
likely look to the Espionage Act to charge Assange or other members of Wikileaks. The
government would be able to charge Assange for illegal possession and distribution of
classified documents. This strategy would side-step many First Amendment challenges
that go along with publication, because there are no federal protections for newsgathering
activities.
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A similar charge was made during the famed Pentagon Papers publication. While

the government only sought to prevent newspapers from publishing the documents, it
sought criminal charges against Daniel Ellsberg for violation of the Espionage Act for
actually providing the Pentagon Papers to the press.79
The crux of the charges against Ellsberg was not the leak itself, as the indictment
did not “attempt to deal specifically with Ellsberg’s turning the secret documents over to
The New York Times,” but rather the possession of photocopies of the document and
conversion “to his own use.”80 To understand the threat that the United States
government perceived Daniel Ellsberg to be, one must examine the lengths to which it
went to ensure Ellsberg’s arrest.
In transcribed remarks published in the Hastings Law Journal, the Honorable
Stephen Trott, a former deputy district attorney in Los Angeles, recalls a criminal case
surrounding the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office.81
Needless to say, when Ellsberg released these papers, the White House went into
some kind of damage control mode. As a result of the release of these papers to
the New York Times [sic] by Ellsberg, a Special Investigations Unit called
"Room 16" was formed in the White House […]. Very quickly [John] Hunt, who
was ex-CIA, and [G. Gordon] Liddy, who was ex-FBI, came up with the idea of
breaking into the psychiatrist's office, stealing the file and, as Young said in a
memo to Ehrlichman, "giving it to Colson so he can put it in the Detroit News."
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They thought they could start a campaign to trash the reputation of Ellsberg who
was about to go on trial in federal court for the unauthorized and felonious
criminal release of classified information. This is how nasty this whole thing
was.82
These extreme actions taken by the government would ultimately lead to the

dismissal of charges against Mr. Ellsberg. “Judge Byrne, because of that and some other
gross missteps on the part of the government in connection with the prosecution of Daniel
Ellsberg, threw out the Ellsberg case on the ground of outrageous government conduct.
So Daniel Ellsberg walked.”83
It is worth noting that the dismissal for Ellsberg was hardly considered a complete
victory. Melville B. Nimmer, who represented the ACLU as amicus curiae in the Ellsberg
case, maintains, “This ambivalence was caused by Judge Byrne’s refusal to rule on the
defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal, a ruling which would have reached the
merits of the Government’s case. Such a ruling had not been sought solely to exonerate
the defendants; the broader objective was to clarify the scope of the Government’s right
to suppress dissemination of documents in which the Government claims a national
security interest.”84
In other words, the Ellsberg case serves only a limited purpose in detailing what
success a prosecution may have in convicting Wikileaks members of the Espionage Act.
It is not insignificant, however, that the charges were brought. It makes exploration of the
statutes mentioned in the charges crucial in understanding what crimes may or may not
have been committed.
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In the present case involving Wikileaks, Pfc. Bradley Manning is currently facing

charges from the US Army for “aiding the enemy” along with “21 further offences of
illegally disclosing classified information.”85 Because Manning is a member of the
military, he is facing charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.86
However, despite the fact that Manning is the initial leaker of the government
documents, members of Wikileaks may theoretically be prosecuted under the same
charges as Ellsberg. The government would likely look to 18 U.S.C. § 793 (e)87 and 18
U.S.C. § 64188 for criminal charges—the same charges made against Daniel Ellsberg.89
18 U.S.C. § 793 (e) makes it criminal to simply have “unauthorized possession” of a
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document related to the national defense. As many of the recently released documents
relate to the execution of United States military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would
also likely be easy to conclude that those documents are “relating to national defense”
and were “willfully communicate[d], deliver[ed, and] transmitted.”90 Again, in New York
Times, Justice Douglas attempted to argue that the press is explicitly exempt from § 793;
would another Court read the 1950 amendment the same way?
There have been two proposals in Congress, one in the House of Representatives
and another in the Senate, to amend the Espionage Act (18 U.S.C § 793). Representative
Peter King proposed 112 H.R. 703, also known as the Securing Human Intelligence and
Enforcing Lawful Dissemination (SHIELD) Act on February 15, 2011.91 Senator John
Ensign proposed a nearly identical bill in the Senate on February 10, 2011.92 The bills
would amend the Espionage Act to clarify or add to the definitions of some terms used in
the bill, as well as expand the scope of the law. One of the key changes is the addition of
“transnational threat” in the first sentence after “or to the advantage of any foreign
nation.”93 The intent here is to expand the meaning of the law, so it will not be interpreted
solely as a means to prevent spying by operatives of one government against the United
States.
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While the Pentagon has already weighed in by referring to the damage done by

the release of documents as “fairly modest,”94 in Gorin v. United States, the Court found
that there need not be proof of injury to the United States to convict under the Espionage
Act.95 For the Court, Justice Reed wrote, “Nor do we think it necessary to prove that the
information obtained was to be used to the injury of the United States. The statute is
explicit in phrasing the crime of espionage as an act of obtaining information relating to
the national defense ‘to be used…to the advantage of any foreign nation.’”96 Reed added
that it did not matter if the foreign nation was considered friend or foe.97
The addition of “transnational threat,” along with the Gorin ruling, would suggest
simply that information that may be used to the advantage of a terrorist group, such as the
Taliban in Afghanistan, would fall under the purview of this statute. To make sure that
point is clear, the proposed bill describes transnational threat.
(A) any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics
trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery
systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national
security of the United States; (B) or any individual or group that engages in an
activity referred to in subparagraph (A).98
It appears the government could make an argument that Wikileaks itself could be
considered a “transnational threat.” The list of activities in subsection (a) does not read as
an exclusive list. In that sense, the section appears to apply to any activity that “threatens
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the national security of the United States.” In fact, it is hard to imagine if any information
about government activities is considered to be not “to the advantage of any foreign
nation.” If intent or actual injury is not a requisite for prosecution, the government could
theoretically prosecute any individual who publishes or leaks seemingly any information
related to national defense.
That said, responding to a motion for a preliminary injunction in United States v.
New York Times, a District Court judge shed doubt on the government’s contention that
the words “communicates, delivers, transmits” as written in subsection (e) can be
replaced by the word “publish.”99 In New York Times v. United States, Justice Douglas
agreed, saying, “There are eight sections in the chapter on espionage and censorship, §§
792-799. In three of those eight ‘publish’ is specifically mentioned […] Thus it is
apparent that Congress was capable of and did distinguish between publishing and
communication in the various sections of the Espionage Act.”100
This point may be somewhat moot. Wikileaks has disseminated these documents
in two different ways. On one hand, the documents were made available for public
consumption on the Internet—an act that may very well be considered publication and
subject to exemption from the Espionage Act. However, the organization also made the
documents available to other members of the press before publishing on the Internet.
Could that “transmission” fall under the auspices of subsection (e)? That transmission
would be nearly identical to that of Daniel Ellsberg, for which Ellsberg at least faced
criminal charges. In addition, Judge Ellis writes in United States v. Rosen, “Congress
drafted [18 U.S.C. § 793] subsection (e) to require one with unlawful possession of
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national defense information to return it to the government even in the absence of a
demand for that information.”101 This implies that the transmission portion of the law
may not be required to prosecute under the statute, meaning regardless of what Wikileaks
did with the documents, simple possession without returning to the proper authorities is a
crime in and of itself.
That said, these activities are very similar to what other media organizations do on
a daily basis. Many publications, such as the New York Times, worked with Wikileaks to
sift through the documents before they were published on the Internet. It would also be
similar to the sharing of information that may be done via the Associated Press. Even an
attempt to prosecute based on possessing or sharing the leaked documents may implicate
members of the mainstream press.
Another charge was made against Ellsberg under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which
prescribes a sentence of not more than 10 years:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use
of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof, or any property made or being made under the contract for the United
States or any department or agency thereof; or whoever receives, conceals, or
retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have
been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted.102
While there is little First Amendment protection extended to news gathering, the
Ellsberg defense may lead to a few loopholes to at least present that Wikileaks did not
knowingly receive stolen information. Nimmer argued in a brief during the Ellsberg case
that the “stealing” as defined by the Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States did not
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apply to Ellsberg’s actions.103 The court found, by citing Irving Trust Co. v. Leff,104 “‘To
steal means to take away from one in lawful possession without right with the intention to
keep wrongfully’ (italics added). Conversion, however, may be consummated without any
intent to keep and without any wrongful taking, where the initial possession by the
converter was lawful.”105
Nimmer argues in the Ellsberg case law review that copying government
documents, not specifically exempted, such as classified documents in 18 U.S.C. § 793
(b) is protected by 17 U.S.C. § 8.106 Title 17, Chapter 8 of the United States Code (which
has since been amended to 17 U.S.C. § 105) states that “Copyright protection under this
title is not available for any work of the United States Government […].”107 In other
words, Nimmer argues that except for documents that are specifically restricted from
dissemination, Title 18, Chapter 641 cannot be construed to ban copying and
dissemination of government documents, as Title 17, Chapter 105 explicitly places all
government documents in the public domain. Again, this may serve Wikileaks’ purposes
in claiming that it did not receive information it knew to be converted for another’s use.
In addition, Nimmer argues that the scope of Chapter 641 is too broad, and thereby
unconstitutional. “If unauthorized reproduction of documents constitutes ‘conversion’
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under section 641, that section is clearly overbroad because then such reproduction of any
governmental document could constitute an act of criminal conversion.”108
This may be the most compelling case to be made in regard to this particular
statute. Whether Wikileaks is considered a publisher or a leaker, the core of freedom of
the press is the freedom from prior restraint on the part of the government. If 18 § 641
could be used to prevent copying of any and all government documents, it is, in a sense,
preventing the publication of all documents related to government activities. This strikes
at one of the principles behind the construction of the First Amendment: the creation of a
free press that can inspect and monitor government actions. The ability of the press to
examine government activity would be severely restrained. The proof of this would be in
the same prosecution of Wikileaks.
However, Assange may have gone beyond just receiving and publishing the
documents. In the chat logs published by Wikileaks, Manning acknowledges
communicating with Assange. He also acknowledges that he was given a preferential
access to the server so that his material would be reviewed sooner.109 Still, the cables
seem a bit vague as to the nature of Manning’s relationship with Assange. There is little
to indicate that Assange encouraged Manning to leak the documents, and therefore the
Wikileaks founder may still be able to argue that he was a passive recipient, just as any
reporter for The New York Times may have been.
However, Manning does acknowledge that some of the data was actually
decrypted by Wikileaks. In the chat logs obtained by federal prosecutors and published
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by Wired.com, Manning allegedly discusses a video that Wikileaks “has, but hasn’t
decrypted yet[…].”110 Hacking and decrypting government documents may be a step
further than passively receiving, and may actually make Assange culpable for the illegal
possession, with the decryption accounting for the conversion of the documents.
The ramifications of such a prosecution would likely still be far reaching. Such a
decisive ruling, based upon the possession of leaked documents, would threaten the
ability of reporters to accept materials from sources if they are related to national
security. This would have a chilling effect on any and all reporting related to national
defense.
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Discussion
It is clear that the courts have intended for the First Amendment to be a guarantee

for the right to publish. What is less clear is whether or not that guarantee is joined by a
protection from prosecution after publication. Courts have long struggled with striking
the appropriate balance between a free press and national security. Even Justice Holmes,
who developed the “clear and present danger” standard, seemed to disagree with its
application in subsequent cases. One thing that is clear, the First Amendment was never,
and will never, translate into a blanket immunity for publishers.
Perhaps the court is not the appropriate arena for this balance to be struck. As
Holmes wrote in Northern Securities v. United States, “Great cases, like hard cases, make
bad law. For great cases are called great not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest
which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment.”1 This sounds all too familiar.
Despite Pentagon assurances that the leaks were not damaging to the United States,
politicians have called for the assassination of those who leaked the documents. A case
involving Wikileaks would no doubt be a great case; it would certainly create
overwhelming interest and stoke emotions, but it would likely also set an incredibly
dangerous precedent.
Consider first and foremost that a prosecution of Wikileaks, while other news
organizations that published many of the same documents are absolved, would reveal an
arbitrary nature of the enforcement of the Espionage Act. If the government will seek
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charges against one organization, but not another, publishers may feel pressured into
compliance with any government demands rather than face possible prosecution
themselves.
One distinguishing factor between Wikileaks and other publishers is that the
former published far more documents than any other publishers. One could argue that the
sheer number of published documents indicates that the organization was doing more
than simply providing context for a public debate and that it was attempting to embarrass
the United States with the release of every possible secret that it could get its hands on.
One could just as easily argue that there should be no secrets in how the government
operates if the public is to be well informed and participate in the decision-making. More
to the point, the legal ramifications of basing a ruling on having released “too many
documents” raises far too many questions and only serves to enhance the ambiguity.
If the prosecution were to focus on the possession of documents, rather than the
publication, the ramifications may be just as significant for the professional and amateur
press. If Julian Assange were convicted for possession of the materials, that ruling could
have an incredibly chilling effect on daily reporting activities. Receiving materials from a
source, even classified materials, has not been used as a means for prosecution in the
past. However, such a ruling may lead reporters to avoid taking such documents in the
future, which would in turn lead to the disclosure of fewer details about government
operations.
While the courts have consistently found that the First Amendment is not a
blanket immunity for publishers, many of its rulings have cited the principle of serving
the public interest. How does one determine if these leaks were critical to the public
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knowledge of how the United States has conducted its foreign policy? For that matter,
who should get to determine such an important, and relatively subjective, fact? The court
would have to establish some sort of test to determine what was serving the public
interest. However, as with the “clear and present danger test,” even legal frameworks can
evolve and be reinterpreted over time. Imagine trying to apply the clear and present
danger test to the Wikileaks documents. While the Pentagon has said that the documents
were mostly embarrassing, a judge may find differently. Without a consistent and welldefined standard for judging what is, for lack of a better word, newsworthy, publishers
will be forced to publish at their own risk and hope for a favorable ruling if ever brought
to trial.
At this time, the prevailing precedents suggest that the First Amendment only
provides complete protection in the case of prior restraint. More importantly, and perhaps
most likely to lead to conviction in the Wikileaks case, there is no shield law for
newsgathering activities at the federal level. That means that even if the publication of
the documents were in some way protected by the First Amendment, Wikileaks would
still be liable for its activities in acquiring the documents that it published. The law, as
written, and most standing legal precedents suggest that reporters are not entitled to
special legal protections as reporters. It seems the reason that reporters haven’t been
charged with the Espionage Act is that the government has avoided prosecuting reporters.
If the government chose to pursue prosecution of journalists for possession of or
publishing classified information, the letter of the law suggests that reporters might be
found guilty. Judging by the statements made by government officials about Wikileaks, it
seems that the government is likely interested in pursuing charges.
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When considering criminalizing the publication of information that relates to the

public interest, it is important to consider the real intent of the First Amendment. Many
court rulings have interpreted the First Amendment in a narrow way—that the intention
of the Amendment is to prevent the government from removing the ability of individuals
to publish. Still, what good is the right to publish if the act can be criminalized after the
fact? The threat of prosecution is, in and of itself, a restraint on publication. If a New York
Times reporter is concerned that he or she may be prosecuted for publishing a story that
includes classified information, he or she may be less likely to publish the story.
The founders intended for the First Amendment to provide for a prosperous press
that would monitor the activities of the government. James Madison wrote, “A people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives.”2 Thomas Jefferson wrote, “Were it left to me to decide whether we
should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without government, I
should not hesitate for a moment to prefer the latter.”3 Both Madison and Jefferson
indicate a preference for erring on the side of publishing too much, rather than a
government shrouded in secrecy.
The need for safeguards and limitations on what can be published, at least after
the fact, has been established in terms of libel. Over time, courts have found that no good
is served by the publication of libelous and unfounded information. Precedents have been
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set forth that allow private citizens the ability to seek damages for such publications. The
law has evolved to act as a check on the reckless publication of untruths. The law has not
evolved as successfully with national security.
When dealing with national security, information can be both true and
inappropriate for publication—for example, the publication of troop movements. The
challenges for the courts, and reporters for that matter, is determining at what point
information becomes an important part of public debate that is necessary for the
establishment of a knowledgeable electorate, rather than information that will do harm to
the national security. In libel, the subject of the information often determines whether or
not the information is of public interest. If that is the determining factor, it could be
argued that all information related to government is of public concern. If those troop
movements indicate the escalation or expansion of a war, that naturally seems like a
necessary part of the public debate. In the case of Wikileaks, a video from an American
helicopter that appears to contradict military claims about an assault that killed civilians
may both reveal crucial elements of troop and equipment deployment and reveal
important information about the execution of the war that are matters to be debated by the
public.4 These issues are far too complex to be decided in the heat of controversy and by
the broad strokes of a court ruling.
They may also be too difficult to leave open to interpretation for much longer. For
much of the last century, organizations like Wikileaks, and even the traditional press for
that matter, have been publishing at their own risk. The Espionage Act, as it is written,
and the legal precedents, as they have been constructed, do not definitively provide clear
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exemptions for reporters who publish national secrets. Yet, the government has avoided
prosecuting members of the professional press—perhaps out of fear of a precedent that
would dangerously weaken the Espionage Act, or simply because there has yet to be a
publication that has truly threatened the national security. In any case, the lack of a
definitive precedent involving the Espionage Act and a member of the professional press
has left a relative uncertainty about what rights reporters do and do not have.
David McCollam argued that for much of the late 20th century, the government
and press found a degree of understanding in this unsettled area of law. In fact, the
government and press have generally found common ground in the ambiguity. He argued
that, historically, journalists have been allowed “to operate on the premise that so long as
they didn’t do anything illegal to actively obtain the classified information, they need not
fear prosecution for receiving it or publishing it in a reasonably responsible matter
consistent with their role under the First Amendment.”5 The government has yet to
attempt to prosecute a professional reporter under the Espionage Act, while there has yet
to be a news story that has directly led to a national security crisis. Even in the famed
New York Times v. United States case, involving the Pentagon Papers, the government
only sought an injunction, but not prosecution under the Espionage Act. Perhaps
Wikileaks, in constructing and promoting a site for leaked information, is crossing the
threshold into “actively” obtaining leaked information. Perhaps the act of decrypting the
files goes beyond passive newsgathering and moves into active theft.
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In this argument, McCollam also seems to urge caution to those who would like

to have the ambiguity resolved through the judiciary. He cites Alexander Bickel, who
argued the New York Times v. United States case, in saying, “Those freedoms that are
neither challenged nor defined are the most secure.”6 McCollam and Bickel seem to be
arguing that the ambiguity creates a flexible environment for responsible parties to act.
The question then becomes whether or not that environment is sustainable in the
21st century. As the media becomes more amateurized through the use of the Internet,
who is and is not a member of the press is open for interpretation. Moreover, can
individuals who do not belong to an institution be trusted to responsibly report and
publish classified information? The trust established between the government and the
press is based upon the upholding of professional standards that creates predictable
behavior. Government officials do not need to threaten professional reporters with
prosecution because they trust those reporters to release the information in a fair manner
and with the appropriate context.
Another cause for concern is the current administration’s extremely tough stance
on leaks and government whistleblowers. Since 2009, the government has charged six
people with violating the Espionage Act.7 This increased use of the law for prosecution
may soon find its way towards implicating reporters.
Several United States officials have used the weight of their offices to pressure
companies to cut ties with Wikileaks. In 2010, when Amazon decided to stop hosting the
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Wikileaks website, Senator Joe Lieberman applauded the decision, saying that it should
“set the standard for other companies Wikileaks is using to distribute its illegally seized
material. I call on any other company or organization that is hosting Wikileaks to
immediately terminate its relationship with them.”8 Other companies followed suit,
leaving Wikileaks without much of its infrastructure for funding.9
With the legality of Wikileaks’ work in question, politicians and government can
exert greater pressure on private companies to cut ties to organizations like Wikileaks.
However, note that the government did not put similar pressure on organizations to cut
ties with The New York Times, which published many of the same documents. Instead,
the unsettled law and legal precedents have left Wikileaks vulnerable to extra-legal
actions that can strip the organization of its ability to continue to publish these
documents. The power of the First Amendment, and any other theoretical right to gather
news, is greatly diminished if the government can force a publisher out of business
without stepping foot into a courtroom.
At the same time, there is also a wave of new media allowing even individual
citizens to transmit information around the world on the Internet. The new actors, with
less structure, and, theoretically, fewer professional standards than the traditional press,
will no doubt create difficulties in maintaining this status quo and fitting into this tacitly
agreed upon status quo.
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Consider that The New York Times, before publishing the documents that it

received from Wikileaks, consulted with the Obama administration to ensure that the
documents would not harm national security. “The Times sent Obama administration
officials the cables it planned to post and invited them to challenge publication of any
information that, in the official view, would harm the national interest. After reviewing
the cables, the officials — while making clear they condemn the publication of secret
material — suggested additional redactions. The Times agreed to some, but not all.”10
Organizations that are perceived to be, in some way, less legitimate than the
professional press may not be afforded an avenue to reach out to public officials.
Certainly, in the case of Wikileaks, being considered an enemy of the state would remove
the incentive to work responsibly with the government. This may actually make the
publication of information that would harm the national security even more likely.
If the balance between publishers and government officials is disturbed, as seems
to be the case with the documents released by Wikileaks, the likelihood of an eventual
court case increases exponentially. It also leaves the press one potential, precedent-setting
decision away from losing even the illusion of First Amendment protections for its
reporting.
A conviction would likely have devastating consequences for the future of the
press and for the future of the Internet. At best, the courts would draw a narrow
interpretation and attempt to charge Wikileaks as a non-press actor and simply for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

“A Note to Readers: The Decision to Publish Diplomatic Documents,” The New York
Times, November 28, 2010, accessed November 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29editornote.html.
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possession and distribution of classified documents. This ruling would have devastating
consequences for the sharing of information through the Internet, and perhaps on
reporters’ ability to inspect documents related to national defense.
Such a ruling would likely evolve into the creation of a separate “media class,”
which, in theory, would have greater protections than the public at large. A separate
media class could be implied if the court determines that there are potential protections
for news gatherers, but they do not apply because Wikileaks is a leaker and not a news
gatherer. Such an implication has not been made in the past, as courts have refused to
acknowledge special exemptions for reporters. However, the selective prosecution of
only Wikileaks for possession of the documents that were published by other actors
would easily be viewed as a double-standard. This raises the question about how one
becomes a member of this protected group, which is allowed to gather information and
interview sources without prosecution. What will make a reporter for the New York
Times, in the eyes of the law, a legitimate actor for the possession, and even
dissemination of information, while Wikileaks is not? The act of prosecutorial discretion
creates two legal systems for news gathering and publishing—those that the government
chooses to act against and those that it does not.
Ironically, this would likely have a chilling effect on this protected class. It would
seem probable that pressure would be felt by reporters to not risk their status as members
of the protected caste. Would advertisement revenue, or even circulation, determine
which members were protected and which were not? This would place serious limitations
on the ability of new media entities to form, while also driving media outlets to strive for
popular stories, rather than those that are unpopular, but serve the public good.
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Perhaps the best solution is through legislation. Perhaps an amendment could be

made to the Espionage Act allowing for those that publish information publicly to be
charged in civil courts in which the prosecution must prove the actions were both
damaging and malicious. Consider how libel cases allow for protection of media outlets
who act in good faith. Could the same not be done for those charged under the Espionage
Act? A distinction could certainly be made between publishers attempting to serve the
public good and individuals transmitting information directly to enemy actors.
Such a provision would encourage the responsible dissemination of information,
without criminalizing the mere possession in the act of good-faith reporting. Much like
when The New York Times conferred with government officials before publishing the
Wikileaks documents, such a provision that allows for reporters, both professional and
amateur, to attempt to responsibly release information on government activities seems to
serve both interests. There would certainly be instances where time constraints may
change what is “reasonable” or “not reasonable,” but a panel of legal, security and media
experts could convene to evaluate these cases on an as needed basis.
This decision is certainly not without its drawbacks, but it would provide a system
that would offer reporters an opportunity to both pursue information that is of national
significance without the threat of possible prosecution, while security officials would
have an opportunity to advise reporters about information that would have significant
national consequences. The tension between the competing interests of national security
and a free press will never go away. There will always be information that the
government will want to keep secret that members of the press, or even a single citizen,
believes is worthy of public scrutiny and debate. What can be changed is the ambiguous
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and unsettled nature of the repercussions for making such information public. Such a
provision would remove the ability of the government to threaten prosecution over
information that is not worthy of infringing on free press activities, while also providing a
mechanism to ensure that the most delicate of matters is revealed publicly in a
responsible and carefully considered manner.
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